BOOKS
Table of Contents
Preface
Section I: Human Rights in the Context of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure 1
Chapter One: Introduction 3
Chapter Two: Adjudication and the Rule of Law 13
1. FROM COMBAT TO CONTRACT: WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTE? 15
2. ADJUDICATION AS THE SURROGATE OF FORCE AND VIOLENCE 23
3. ‘RULE OF LAW’ AND ‘LAW AND ORDER’ NECESSITATE EACH OTHER 31
4. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW 36
Chapter Three: Truthfinding and Impartiality in the Criminal Process 43
1. INTRODUCTION 43
2. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 47
3. THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR TRUTHFINDING? 57
4. THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN TRUTHFINDING (INVESTIGATION) AND
IMPARTIALITY (ADVERSARINESS) 65
4.1. Investigation and (Im)partiality 66
4.1.1. The Procrustean Tendency 71
4.2. Adjudication and Impartiality 75
4.2.1. Impartiality and the Criteria of Essentiality 80
5. CONCLUSION 84
Chapter Four: The Crown and the Criminal: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination 87
1. THE PRIVILEGE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 87
2. THE LOGIC OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 92
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3. ON THE POWER TO MAKE CRIMES 103
4. THE PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 108
4.1. Autonomous and Ancillary Procedures 110
4.2. Procedural Sanctioning 114
4.2.1. The Need for Procedural Rights 114
4.2.2. The Need for Procedural Sanctioning 115
4.2.3. Sanctioning in Substantive Fashion 117
4.2.4. Sanctioning by Procedural Fashion 118
4.2.5. Impact on Outcome 119
4.2.6. Importance of Issue, Truth and Impartiality 120
4.3. The Procedural Principle of Legality 122
5. EXCLUSIONARY RULE: THE ALTER-EGO OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION 125
5.1. Origin 127
5.2. Scope 129
5.3. Is the Rule Prescriptive or Instrumental 132
5.4. Comparative and International Aspects 136
6. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITION OF TORTURE
DERIVING FROM ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 140
6.1. The Defi nition of Torture as per Article 1(1) of the
Convention 141
6.2. Elements of the Defi nition of Torture as a Criminal Offence
(Corpus Delicti) 144
7. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 146
8. CONCLUSION 151
Chapter Five: Plea Bargaining 159
Chapter Six: Conclusion 169
Section II: Human Rights in the Context of Substantive Criminal Law 173
Chapter Seven: Introduction 175
Chapter Eight: Beccaria: Theories on Punishment and Legal Formalism 179
1. ON PUNISHMENT 181
1.1. The Origin of Punishments and the Right to Punish 181
1.2. Mildness of Punishments 186
1.3. Promptness and Certainty of Punishment 188
2. ON LEGAL FORMALISM AND INTERPRETATION OF RULES 192
2.1. Interpretation of the Laws 193
2.2. Obscurity of the Laws 194
2.1.1. Conciseness 195
2.1.2. The Fixed Nature of the Law 197
3. CONCLUSION 200
Chapter Nine: Punishment and its Infl uence on Normative Integration 203
1. INTRODUCTION 203
2. THE PARADOX OF PUNISHMENT 205
3. ANOMIE, PUNISHMENT AND EFFECTS ON NORMATIVE INTEGRATION 209
3.1. Theory of Punishment 212
3.2. Psychological Aspect of Normative Integration 216
3.3. Sociological Aspect of Normative Integration 219
3.3.1. Durkheim’s Theory of Collective Conscience 219
3.3.2. Mead and his Theory of Punitive Justice 225
3.3.3. Social Stability Through the Intercession of Punishment 229
3.3.4. Normative Integration Through the Intercession of Legal Process 232
4. SAFEGUARDS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW METHODS OF
PUNISHMENT 240
5. CONCLUSION 243
Chapter Ten: On Legal Formalism: The Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 245
1. INTRODUCTION 245
2. THE NATURE OF LEGAL CONCEPTS, NORMS OR RULES 249
2.1. Scientifi c Norms vs. Legal Norms 249
2.2. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Norms 252
2.3. The Negation of Norms 257
3. CONCEPT AND REALITY 260
3.1. André-Vincent and Engisch 261
3.2. The Positivist Position 265
3.3. The Normative-Systematic Position 268
3.4. Hegel and Marx 271
3.5. Unger 273
4. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 276
4.1. The Dialectic or Antinomy of Legal Formalism 276
4.2. Purposive Legal Reasoning 281
4.2.1. Criminal Responsibility under Mistake of Law 284
4.2.1.1. The Limits of Subjectivisation 290
4.2.1.2. The Norm and the Policy 292
4.2.2. The Negative Aspects: Ex Post Facto Laws, Vague Laws and
Nonlaws 294
4.2.3. The Positive Aspects: Analogy Lato Sensu and Analogy Inter
Legem – Latent Purposive Legal Reasoning 299
4.3. Confl ict and Form in Law 304
4.3.1. Confl ict and Legal Regulation 304
4.3.2. Confl ict and the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 310
4.4. The Illusion of the Major Premise 315
4.5. The Nature of the Minor Premises 319
4.6. The Problem of the Burden of Proof 321
4.7. Judicial Interpretation 332
4.8. Consequences of the Myth of the Principle of Legality 339
4.8.1. The Continental Criminal System 339
4.8.2. The Anglo-Saxon Criminal System 342
5. CONCLUSION 344
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion 347
Section III: Essays on Human Rights in the Context of International and Constitutional Law 349
Chapter Twelve: On the Interpretation of Legal Precedents and
of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 351
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 351
2. CHECKS AND BALANCES BETWEEN THE THREE BRANCHES OF POWER 355
3. INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL PRECEDENTS AND THE JUDGMENTS OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 366
3.1. The Doctrine of Precedents 368
3.2. How to Read and Interpret the Judgment 376
3.3. The Erga Omnes Effect of ECHR Law 380
4. THE INDIVIDUAL IN LITIGATION WITH THE STATE 383
4.1. The Individual in Direct Litigation with the State 386
4.2. The Individual in Indirect Litigation with the State 389
5. CONCLUSION 391
Chapter Thirteen: Access to Court as a Human Right According to the European Convention of Human Rights 393
1. INTRODUCTION 393
2. ‘ACCESS TO COURT’ DOCTRINE ACCORDING TO THE CASE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 397
2.1. Basic Cases Establishing the Doctrine 397
2.1.1. Access to Court According to the Convention 397
2.1.2. The Penumbras and the Umbra of Access to Court 399
2.1.3. Difference Between Civil and Criminal Cases with Respect to
Access to Court 402
2.2. Recent Cases 404
3. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 410
Chapter Fourteen: Morality of Virtue vs. Morality of Mere Duty or Why Do Penalties Require Legal Process Whereas Rewards Do Not? 413
1. FULLER’S MORALITY OF DUTY VS. MORALITY OF ASPIRATION 415
2. THE FUNCTION OF LEGAL FORMALISM AND CRITERIA 418
3. THE CENTRALITY OF CONFLICT 421
4. CONCLUSION 427
Bibliography 429
Index of Authors Cited 441
Index of Topics 445